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I examine the role of accounting information in the end-of-first day overpricing 
of IPO stocks. Sloan (1996) and Teoh et al. (1998) suggest earnings-based 
explanations for the mispricing while Healy and Palepu (1990) suggest a risk-based 
explanation. In view of the conflicting explanations for the end-of-first-day mispricing 
of IPOs from prior studies, I first examine which possible explanation (earnings-based 
vs. other) is consistent with my sample IPO firms. For this task, I employ the 
methodology first suggested by Bernard et al. (1997). This involves an examination of 
post-IPO abnormal returns. The results of my main tests using all my sample IPO 
firms suggest that, on average, the mispricing of IPOs is consistent with earning-based 
explanations. That is, the mispricing arises from market participants failing to 
incorporate the implication of pre-IPO earnings components for future earnings as in 
Sloan (1996). However, life cycle tests discussed later suggest that this result may be 
driven by growth firms.    
I extend my examination to investigate the role of life cycle in IPO mispricing 
since life cycle has been offered as a possible explanation (e.g., Liu 2008) but the role 
of life cycle is largely unexplored. Thus, I examine possible mechanisms by which life 
cycle could affect IPO pricing. I examine two specific research questions. The first 
question is whether life cycle has any effect on IPO mispricing beyond affecting the 
relative proportion of accruals and cash flows. In this regard, I find no evidence that 
life cycle stage explains post-IPO abnormal returns, whether used alone in a regression 
explaining post-IPO returns, or used together with accrual and cash flow ranks. The 





(earnings-based vs. other) and I document some evidence that life cycle moderates the 
type of mispricing. Specifically, the mispricing of growth- (mature-) stage sample IPO 
firms is (is not) consistent with earnings-based explanations. My evidence regarding 
the mispricing of decline-stage firms is mixed: the timing and associations tests 
provide evidence that the mispricing of decline-stage firms is consistent with earnings-
based explanations; the combined test provides evidence consistent with other 
explanations. Thus, it seems that earnings play a role in the mispricing of decline stage 
IPOs but not in the Sloan (1996) sense.  
This evidence has implications for the role of earnings in explaining future 
prospects, and hence value, of a firm. Specifically, it raises questions about why 
investors seemingly do a poor job of predicting the future prospects of growth and 
decline stage firms using current period earnings information when the opposite seems 
to be true for mature firms. Regulators might be interested to know what disclosures 







The accounting and finance literature documents evidence that shares of initial 
public offering (IPO) firms are overpriced by the end of the first day of public trading, 
leading to inferior long-run stock price performance of IPO firms relative to non-IPO 
firms matched on size and industry (Ritter 1991, Loughran and Ritter 1995).
1
 This 
study examines the overpricing of IPO stocks and explores a possible role for 
accounting information, particularly components of earnings, to explain the 
overpricing. Sloan (1996) documents evidence suggesting that companies with 
relatively high accruals or low cash flows are overpriced. The evidence from Sloan 
(1996) is particularly relevant for IPO firms which tend to be growth firms
2
 that go 
public to finance investments and to fund shortfalls in operating cash flows. The 
earnings of these growth firms are likely to contain a larger (smaller) proportion of 
accruals (cash flows from operations) compared to earnings of firms that are not 
experiencing growth and this results in more mispricing for IPO firms. Thus, I 
examine a possible link between the overpricing of IPO stocks and Sloan’s (1996) 
anomaly. I also examine a possible role for life cycle since prior studies of IPO 
performance (e.g., Liu 2008, Ball and Shivakumar 2008) have suggested life cycle as 
an omitted variable. The role of life cycle in the mispricing of IPO stocks is largely 
                                                          
1
 Another IPO pricing anomaly that is not part of my study is that shares of IPO firms are offered to the 
public at prices below fundamental values (Ibbotson et al. 1988).  
 
2
 My sample includes growth, mature, and decline stage firms. Contrary to the intuition that only 
growth firms go public, mature and decline firms are likely to go public to retire debt when an increase 
in business risk is imminent (e.g., Healy and Palepu 1990) or for reasons unrelated to funding 







unexplored. Therefore, I am interested in gaining a better understanding of the role 
that life cycle plays in the overpricing of IPOs. 
Broadly, I classify possible explanations for the overpricing of IPO stocks into 
two groups:  (a) earnings-based explanations, that is, the failure by market participants 
to incorporate the implications of earnings components in IPO financial statements for 
future earnings as in Sloan (1996)
3
, or (b) other explanations. The latter group of 
explanations includes failure by researchers or market participants to estimate the risk 
associated with IPO stocks (as in Healy and Palepu 1990) and total failure by investors 
to utilize the information in financial statements (as in Shiller 1990 and Ritter 1991). 
To a large extent, both groups of explanations for IPO mispricing involve irrational 
investor behavior.
4
 The first instance involves irrational investor behavior based on 
earnings. This is likely a numerator effect (see note 3) though earnings may inform 
investors about risk, a denominator effect. The second instance is irrational investor 
behavior based on everything else rather than earnings. This includes a failure to 
correctly estimate the risk associated with IPO firms or a total disregard of accounting 
information. I discuss this in detail later. My study attempts to examine which 
explanation for IPO overpricing (earnings vs. other) is consistent with the data.  
Healy and Palepu (1990) provide evidence that IPOs convey information about 
changes in risk rather than changes in the level of expected earnings. In other words, 
Healy and Palepu (1990) provide evidence that other explanations, particularly risk, 
                                                          
3
 This is also known as the “numerator” explanation based on a classical firm valuation model. In this 
model, the value of a firm equals the sum of its expected future abnormal earnings discounted to the 
present using an appropriate measure of risk. The numerator of the valuation model comprises the 
expected earnings of a firm while the denominator represents a time value of money adjustment for 
level of risk. Earnings is usually considered a numerator factor in mispricing; many non-earnings 
factors are described as denominator factors though some could also be viewed as numerator factors. 
  
4





are more likely to explain IPO mispricing than earnings-based explanations. 
Subsequent studies of IPO mispricing support earnings-based explanations. For 
example, Teoh et al. (1998a, 1998b) report evidence that overpricing of IPOs is linked 
to accruals although some controversy exists as to whether the role of accruals is 
limited to cases of earnings management or is broader in scope, as in Sloan (1996).  
Since prior studies produce conflicting explanations for IPO mispricing, this 
study can enhance our understanding of IPO mispricing. I expect regulators to be 
interested in knowing whether the documented pricing anomaly is specific to IPO 
settings or a manifestation of a wider anomaly (as in Sloan 1996) which applies to all 
firms. This would, for instance, help in defining the scope (IPO firms only vs. all 
firms) of any financial reporting changes that are meant to address the anomaly. 
Furthermore, a better understanding of the source of the mispricing (e.g., earnings-
based explanations vs. other explanations) could guide both regulators and preparers 
of IPO financial statements. On the other hand, the role of life cycle stage is likely to 
be of interest to sophisticated investors such as mutual fund managers specializing in 
securities of firms in specific life cycle stages.
5
 Furthermore, by using pre-IPO 
financial statement information rather than the first post-IPO financial statements (as 
in Teoh et al. 1998a and 1998b), I am able to make a more refined inference regarding 
the role of accounting information in the mispricing of IPOs.  
In tests using my full sample of IPO firms, I document evidence that, on 
average, overpricing of IPO stocks recorded at the end of the first day of public 
trading is consistent with earnings-based explanations. That is, earnings play a role in 
                                                          
5
 For instance, “growth funds” are a type of mutual fund that invests in the stocks of companies that 
have the potential for large capital gains; these companies are implicitly young firms in their growth 





IPO mispricing similar to the one documented in Sloan (1996). My findings contrast 
with Healy and Palepu’s (1990) evidence that post-IPO stock returns cannot be 
explained by the revision of analysts’ earnings forecasts subsequent to the IPO and 
changes in the level of earnings subsequent to the IPO date. In essence, they do not 
find a role for earnings in IPO mispricing, but I do. Healy and Palepu (1990) also find 
evidence of risk changes (asset and equity betas) around the IPO date. My results 
cannot completely rule out that some mispricing might be related to risk but suggest 
that risk is unlikely to be the sole explanation.   
Regarding life cycle, I find no evidence that life cycle stage explains post-IPO 
returns, whether life cycle is used alone in a returns regression or life cycle is used 
together with accrual and cash flow ranks. However, in analyses that divide the sample 
IPO firms into life cycles, I find evidence that life cycle affects the type of mispricing 
(earnings vs. other). In particular, I find evidence that the mispricing of growth- 
(mature-) stage IPO firms is (is not) consistent with earnings-based explanations. 
Evidence relating to decline-stage IPO firms is mixed. Specifically, the timing and 
association tests support earnings-based explanations for mispricing of decline-stage 
IPOs while the combined test results do not. This might suggest that though earnings 
play a role in the mispricing of decline-stage IPOs, the role of earnings is different in 
context from Sloan (1996).       
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and 
develops the hypotheses that I test. Section 3 describes my tests and research design. 





2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.1. Literature review 
The accounting and finance literature documents two pricing anomalies related 
to IPO firms and a third pricing anomaly related to all firms. In the first IPO anomaly, 
IPO firms are offered to the market at prices below fundamental values (Ibbotson et al. 
1988). In the second IPO anomaly, and focus of my study, IPO stocks are overpriced 
by the end of the first day of public trading which results in IPO firms registering 
inferior long-run stock price performance relative to non-IPO firms matched on size 
and industry (Ritter 1991, Loughran and Ritter 1995). A third anomaly related to all 
firms suggests that stock prices do not fully reflect the information about future 
earnings contained in current period earnings components (Sloan 1996). Stated 
differently, the evidence in Sloan (1996) suggests that cash flows are underpriced 
and/or accruals are overpriced. Dechow and Schrand (2004) provide an overview of 
the literature relating to Sloan’s (1996) anomaly.    
Prior studies of the mispricing and subsequent underperformance of IPO firms 
can be grouped into two categories. The first category comprises studies that attribute 
IPO mispricing to earnings, in particular to the weights attached to components of 
earnings. Within this group, a number of studies examine arguments for and against a 
possible role of earnings management in the mispricing. For example, Teoh et al. 
(1998a and 1998b) provide some evidence in support of an earnings management 
hypothesis whereas Ball and Shivakumar (2008) and Armstrong et al. (2009) provide 
some evidence that contradicts the earnings management hypothesis. The second 





factors other than earnings. This latter group includes studies that attribute the 
mispricing of IPO stocks to risk factors and what has come to be known as “fads” 
(investors being unjustifiably optimistic about the future prospects of a particular firm 
or industry). A growing number of studies examine life cycle as a possible alternative 
explanation for some of the key observations from the earnings management literature 
(e.g., Black 1998, Liu 2008, Ball and Shivakumar 2008). I discuss the prior studies in 
detail below. 
Shiller (1990) provides a behavioral perspective on IPO mispricing and 
suggests that “firms go public when investors are irrationally overoptimistic about the 
future potential of certain industries.”  In other words, managers time the listing of 
firms to exploit investor sentiment. In a related study, Ritter (1991) examines the 
returns to a strategy of investing in IPO stocks at the close of public trading on the IPO 
date and holding the IPO stocks for 3-years. He documents 3-year holding period 
returns of about 34% for IPO firms compared to 62% for size- and industry-matched 
non-IPO firms.
6
 Ritter (1991) also finds that younger companies and companies going 
public in high volume years perform worse than average. He examines whether the 
IPO firms underperform merely due to bad luck, or whether the market systematically 
overestimates the growth opportunities of IPO firms. He concludes that his evidence is 
                                                          
6
 The 28% differential in 3-year holding period returns in Ritter’s (1991) study is concentrated in year 1    
(10 %) and year 3 (13%). The remaining 5% is observed in year 2. Thus, an examination of a 12-month 
window from the IPO date captures a significant part of the abnormal returns of IPOs and is sufficient 
to understand the role of earnings in the end-of-first-day mispricing of IPOs. In additional tests reported 
later in this paper, I repeat all my main tests (timing, association, and combined) for both the full 
sample and the life cycle sample using a return window of 36 months instead of 12 months. My 






consistent with Shiller (1990), that many firms go public near the peak of industry-
specific fads.  
Healy and Palepu (1990) examine changes in risk (asset and equity betas), 
changes in earnings levels, and analyst forecast revisions
7
 around primary equity 
offers (IPOs) and report evidence that the offers convey information about risk 
changes rather than changes in the level of future earnings. Finally, Kim and Ritter 
(1999) attribute the mispricing of IPOs to the low predictive ability of comparable 
firm multiples (P/E, market-to-book, price-to-sales) which are widely used in 
conjunction with accounting information to value IPO stocks.  
Most studies of IPO mispricing provide evidence that IPO firms have, on 
average, higher accruals than non-IPO firms. Thus, the overpricing of IPO firms is 
consistent with Sloan’s (1996) evidence that firms with high accruals (low cash flows) 
are overpriced. However, controversy exists regarding the cause of the high accruals 
documented for IPO firms. Specifically, some prior studies attribute the high accruals 
of IPO firms to earnings management while a growing literature supports an 
alternative explanation based on life cycle. I discuss these streams of research in the 
next two paragraphs.       
Studies that combine earnings management and IPO mispricing examine 
whether managers manipulate accruals in the IPO prospectus to boost stock prices. For 
example, Teoh et al. (1998a, 1998b) examine discretionary accruals of IPO firms and 
                                                          
7
 Healy and Palepu (1990) examine Value Line analyst forecasts for the quarter of the IPO 
announcement and for the next 5 quarters. They compare actual earnings for the quarter of the IPO 
announcement and revised post-IPO forecasts for the next 5 quarters with corresponding pre-IPO 






report evidence of unusually high discretionary accruals in the IPO year and the year 
after, suggesting an earnings management explanation for the subsequent 
underperformance of IPO firms. Ball and Shivakumar (2008) study earnings quality in 
a sample of UK firms at the time of IPOs and find that contrary to the view espoused 
by the earnings management hypothesis of Teoh et al. (1998a, 1998b), IPO firms 
report more conservatively. In addition, Ball and Shivakumar (2008) raise important 
questions concerning the reliability of the discretionary accrual estimates in Teoh et al. 
(1998a, 1998b). Liu (2008) provides evidence suggesting that commonly used 
discretionary accrual models such as the one used in Teoh et al. (1998a, 1998b) are 
misspecified, resulting in an upward (downward) bias of discretionary accrual 
estimates for growth (decline) firms.
8
 
Armstrong et al. (2009) provide some of the strongest evidence against the 
earnings management hypothesis of Teoh et al. (1998a, 1998b). Armstrong et al. 
(2009) examine the discretionary accruals of IPO firms after correcting for known 
biases in commonly used discretionary accrual models and find evidence that 
discretionary accruals in the year of the IPO are not statistically different from zero.
9
 
In addition, Armstrong et al. (2009) reexamine the incentives of managers of IPO 
firms to inflate accruals and find no evidence of a relation between several measures 
of discretionary accruals and IPO issue price, post-IPO equity values, insider trading 
profits, and executive compensation. Finally, they provide evidence that the widely 
                                                          
8
 Liu (2008) suggests that IPOs are associated with the growth stage of a firm’s life cycle. My sample 
suggests that although IPOs are mainly growth firms, many mature and decline firms also go public. 
See section 2.2.3 for a brief explanation of why mature and decline firms might go public. 
 
9
 Specifically, Armstrong et al. (2009) correct for the following: (1) the “small-denominator bias” raised 






reported negative correlation between IPO-year discretionary accruals and post-IPO 
returns is an artifact of cash flow mispricing. In other words, when cash flows are 
included in the analysis, accruals do not explain post-IPO abnormal returns.   
Life cycle theory provides an alternative explanation for the high level of 
accruals documented by earnings management studies of IPO firms. In particular, life 
cycle theory suggests that growth firms are likely to have higher working capital 
accruals and lower operating cash flows relative to mature-stage and decline-stage 
firms (Black 1998, Liu 2008) even in the absence of earnings management. Thus, to 
the extent that life cycle leads to higher accruals and low cash flows for IPO firms, 
IPO stocks are likely to be overpriced as in Sloan (1996). Alternatively, life cycle may 
result in IPO mispricing by affecting the riskiness rather than the earnings components 
of IPO firms. In other words, whether life cycle moderates the form of mispricing 
(e.g., earnings-based vs. other) and/or the extent of mispricing is an empirical 
question. 
 To summarize, the cause of the end-of-first-day overpricing of the stocks of 
IPO firms is still an open question. Specifically, is overpricing related to risk changes 
around IPOs, or to the behavior of investors who are unjustifiably optimistic about the 
future prospects of an industry/ firm with no regard to accounting information? 
Alternatively, is overpricing a result of failure by market participants to incorporate 
the information about future earnings contained in IPO financial statements? 
Furthermore, the role of life cycle, which potentially affects both the relative 
proportions of earnings components and the riskiness of IPO firms, is unclear. For 





components? In addition, what is the effect of life cycle on the likelihood of earnings-
based vs. other explanations (e.g., risk) for IPO mispricing? This study attempts to 
address these questions. 
2.2. Hypothesis development  
I begin my quest for a better understanding of the overpricing of IPOs by 
investigating whether the overpricing is most consistent with an earnings-based 
explanation or with other explanations. This study does not attempt to separate the 
non-earnings (other) explanations. My main tests for discriminating between earnings-
based and other explanations utilize an approach suggested by Bernard et al. (1997) 
and employed by Cheng and Thomas (2006). The approach involves an examination 
of the abnormal returns of IPO firms subsequent to offering. If investors fail to fully 
incorporate information about future earnings that is contained in IPO earnings, the 
resulting mispricing will be corrected as future earnings are reported. Consequently, 
post-IPO abnormal returns (a) will be concentrated around post-IPO earnings 
announcements, reflecting investors’ surprise about future earnings, and (b) will be 
associated with the components of earnings in the IPO financial statements that 
investors failed to incorporate.
10
 If I find evidence of both (a) and (b) occurring for 
IPO firms, then that evidence points to a failure to interpret earnings information as a 
source of IPO overpricing. If the overpricing of IPO stocks is not due to investors’ 
failure to correctly interpret earnings, then perhaps it is due to risk or other 
explanations such as investors being unjustifiably optimistic about the future prospects 
                                                          
10
 Bernard et al. (1997) use accruals in their tests. However, based on evidence that the negative 
correlation between accruals and post-IPO returns is an artifact of cash flow mispricing (Armstrong et 
al. 2009), tests that use cash flows instead of (or together with) accruals are likely to have greater 






of an industry or firm with little regard to accounting information (fads). These other 
explanations for IPO mispricing are likely to generate post-IPO abnormal returns that 
are (i) not concentrated around earnings announcements and/or (ii) are not associated 
with pre-IPO earnings components. Appendix I provides a detailed discussion of risk 
as a possible explanation for IPO mispricing. I develop the hypotheses in the 
subsequent subsections.  
2.2.1 Initial assessment: IPO overpricing and the accrual anomaly 
Life cycle theory suggests that before accessing external financing, growth 
firms are likely to have high accruals and low operating cash flows. Since the IPO 
firms in my sample are mainly growth firms, overpricing at the offering date might be 
a consequence of high accruals and low cash flows (Sloan 1996). Thus, my initial test 
assesses the extent to which IPO overpricing might be related to mispricing of 
earnings components documented in Sloan (1996). If IPO firms have, on average, a 
higher proportion of accruals and a lower proportion of operating cash flows 
compared to non-IPO firms matched on size and industry, and if earnings components 
are a major source of IPO overpricing (Sloan 1996), then the differences in 
performance between IPO firms and matched non-IPO firms can be explained by 
earnings components. This leads to the following hypothesis, stated in both the null 
and alternative forms: 
H1null: Differences in post-IPO stock price performance between IPO firms and non-
IPO firms matched on size and industry cannot be explained by differences in 






H1alt: Differences in post-IPO stock price performance between IPO firms and non-
IPO firms matched on size and industry can be explained by differences in the 
relative amounts of accruals and/or cash flows from operations. 
2.2.2 Further assessment: understanding more about the role of accounting in IPO 
overpricing 
I first attempt to distinguish between earnings-based explanations and other 
explanations for overpricing of IPO stocks using an approach suggested by Bernard et 
al. (1997) and employed by Cheng and Thomas (2006). I apply this approach only to 
my sample IPO firms.
11
 Broadly, the approach comprises a “timing” test which 
examines the pattern of post-IPO abnormal returns over time, and an “association” test 
which examines the association between post-IPO abnormal returns and earnings 
components in the pre-IPO year. I also include a “combined” test that exploits features 
of both the timing and association tests. I describe the tests and related hypotheses 
below. 
2.2.2.1 Timing test 
 IPO financial statements provided with the prospectus at the time of offering 
constitute a major part of the information set that market participants use to form 
expectations about future earnings of IPO firms and to price IPO stocks at the IPO 
date. At future earnings announcement dates, market participants observe realized 
earnings and compare realized earnings to expected earnings. At this point, market 
participants correct for any deviations from expectations by selling or bidding down 
                                                          
11
 I expect that mispricing of matched non-IPO firms, if any, will be relatively trivial compared to the 






stocks that were initially overpriced and buying or bidding up underpriced stocks. The 
timing test exploits this process by examining the timing of abnormal returns of IPO 
firms subsequent to the IPO. If, on average, post-IPO abnormal returns are 
concentrated around earnings announcement dates, this suggests that market 
participants correct a substantial portion of their expectations about future earnings 
when they receive new earnings information. This leads to the following hypothesis, 
stated in both the null and alternative forms: 
H2null: Post-IPO abnormal returns are not concentrated around earnings 
announcement dates. 
 
H2alt: Post-IPO abnormal returns are concentrated around earnings 
announcement dates.      
     
The timing test can distinguish between earnings-based explanations and risk 
explanations based on researcher-error in estimating risk of IPOs or explanations 
based on market-error in estimating risk if the market corrects prior errors in a 
continuous manner (see Appendix I for a detailed discussion).  
2.2.2.2 Association test 
Rejecting the null form of H2 does not rule out other explanations in favor of 
earnings-based explanations. For instance, a market-error risk-based explanation (i.e. 





error when post-IPO earnings are announced.
12
 To rule out this possibility, I use the 
association test to assess the link between abnormal returns subsequent to offering and 
the earnings information in IPO financial statements. Specifically, I employ the 
association test to examine how the magnitudes of components of earnings in IPO 
financial statements correlate with the magnitude of post-IPO mean annual abnormal 
returns. If mean annual abnormal returns a year after offering are negatively 
(positively) associated with accruals (cash flows) announced pre-IPO, this suggests 
that IPO overpricing is related to earnings. Specifically, such an association would be 
consistent with failure by market participants to accurately interpret the implications 
of accruals and cash flows in IPO financial statements for future earnings. Risk-based 
explanations (e.g., market participants correcting their errors in estimating risk when 
post-IPO earnings are announced) would be less likely.
13,14
 Thus, I test the following 
hypothesis, stated in both the null and alternative forms:  
H3null: Post-IPO abnormal returns are not negatively (positively) associated with 
the level of accruals (cash flows from operations) in IPO financial 
statements. 
   
                                                          
12
 Prior studies (e.g., Epstein and Turnbull 1980, Holthausen and Verrecchia 1988) show that earnings 
announcements reduce risk associated with investing in a firm’s stock by conveying information to 
investors about the firm’s activities. In other words, these studies suggest that risk decreases around 
earnings announcements.  A decrease in risk is unlikely to explain the observed negative returns, which 
would be more consistent with an increase in risk.  
 
13
 As an alternative to a test of the association between post-IPO abnormal returns and pre-IPO earnings 
components, Bernard et al. (1997) propose a trading strategy of taking long (short) positions in the 
lowest (highest) accruals-to-total assets deciles of sample firms and then examining whether the returns 
from such a strategy are consistently positive over the sample years. 
 
14
 My tests cannot completely rule out a risk-based explanation. However, finding support for the 





H3alt: Post-IPO abnormal returns are negatively (positively) associated with the 
level of accruals (cash flows from operations) in IPO financial statements.   
 
H1 and H3 are similar. However, H1 compares IPO and size- and industry-
matched non-IPO firms whereas H3 makes the comparison within the sample of IPO 
firms. As discussed earlier, if the post-IPO abnormal returns are associated with the 
accrual and cash flow components of earnings in the pre-IPO year, this is inconsistent 
with a market error risk-based explanation unless the error in the market’s risk 
estimate is closely linked with the earnings components in the IPO financial 
statements. Likewise, an association between post-IPO abnormal returns and the 
accrual and cash flow components of earnings in the pre-IPO year is inconsistent with 
researcher errors. In other words, an association between post-IPO abnormal returns 
and the accrual and cash flow components of earnings in the pre-IPO year makes the 
earnings-based explanation more likely.    
2.2.2.3 Combined test 
 This test combines the essential features of the timing and association tests. 
Recall that the timing test examines whether post-IPO abnormal returns are 
concentrated around earnings announcements. On the other hand, the association test 
examines whether post-IPO abnormal returns covary with the accruals and cash flow 
components of earnings in pre-IPO financial statements. Consequently, a combined 
test examines the association between post-IPO abnormal returns and pre-IPO 





Thus, combining the timing and association tests leads to the following hypothesis, 
stated in both the null and alternative forms: 
 
H4null: The association between post-IPO abnormal returns and pre-IPO accrual 
and cash flow components of earnings is not different in the 
announcement window than in the non-announcement window.  
   
H4alt: The association between post-IPO abnormal returns and pre-IPO accrual 
and cash flow components of earnings is different in the announcement 
window than in the non-announcement window.  
2.2.3 Role of life cycle stage 
Ex ante, I expect IPOs to be firms in the growth stage of their life cycles. In 
fact, my sample of IPOs includes growth firms (1,917), mature firms (1,098) and 
decline firms (488). I examine the planned use of IPO proceeds to gain some 
understanding of why firms go public.
15
 Based on my subsample of 10 firms for each 
life cycle stage, I find that growth firms use IPO proceeds for new production facilities 
and expansion of existing ones (90% of the time) and to repay debts (10%). Mature 
firms use IPO proceeds for repaying existing shareholders and repaying debts (70%) 
and for acquisitions (30%). Decline firms use IPO proceeds to repay debts (60%) and 
for potential acquisitions or diversification (40%).  
Though IPOs cut across all life cycle stages, growth firms seem to be dominant 
in IPO samples. Thus, critics of the earnings management explanation for IPO 
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 My analysis uses 30 IPO firms, drawn to include (i) the two largest firms, and (ii) two firms around 








 size-percentiles of each life cycle stage. Due to the small sample 






mispricing (e.g. Liu 2008) argue that life cycle is an omitted variable in studies such as 
Teoh et al. (1998a, 1998b) that attribute the mispricing of IPO stocks to earnings 
management. In other words, life cycle may be an alternative explanation for the 
evidence cited in support of the earnings management hypothesis. In particular, Liu 
(2008) provides evidence that commonly used discretionary accrual models are 
misspecified, leading to an upward (downward) bias in discretionary accrual estimates 
for firms in the growth (decline) stage of their life cycle.
16
 However, the role of life 
cycle and the mechanism by which life cycle affects IPO mispricing is not clear.  
In this study, I consider two potential roles for life cycle. First, life cycle could 
affect on the level of accruals and cash flows, which could in turn lead to IPO 
mispricing (Sloan 1996). Second, life cycle could affect the riskness of an IPO firm 
which in turn could lead to mispricing if market participants fail to estimate the 
riskiness of the firm. Thus, I investigate whether life cycle has any effect on IPO 
mispricing beyond its effect on earnings components. Then, I examine if life cycle 
affects the likelihood of earnings-based vs. other (non-earnings-based) explanations 
for IPO mispricing.
17
 Thus, I attempt to address the following research questions: 
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 Liu (2008) uses a general sample of firms from Compustat to show that discretionary accrual 
estimates are biased for growth and decline firms. She then reexamines prior studies associated with 
IPOs (Teoh et al., 1998a, b) and write-downs (Rees et al., 1996), incorporating life cycle in her analysis. 
Liu (2008) provides evidence that IPOs and write-downs are largely associated with the growth and the 
decline stages of a firm’s life cycle, respectively. After incorporating life cycle in her analysis, Liu 
(2008) shows that the inferences in Teoh et al (1998a, b) and Rees et al.(1996) change. In other words, 
life cycle is an omitted variable in both Teoh et al. (1998a, b) and Rees et al. (1996).   
 
17
 Ex ante, it is tempting to predict the life cycle stage(s) likely to be associated with either earnings-
based explanations or other explanations. However, extreme caution is necessary since the theoretical 
basis for such a prediction seems weak. For example, to the extent that mature firms have earnings 
generating opportunities that are in steady state, current period earnings are likely to be a reliable 
predictor of future earnings. Thus, overpricing of mature IPOs would more likely result from factors 
other than earnings. On the other hand, it could be argued that current period earnings of growth and 





RQ1: Does life cycle have any effect on IPO mispricing beyond its effect on 
earnings components? 
RQ2: How does life cycle stage affect the likelihood of earnings-based and non-
earnings-based explanations for IPO mispricing? 
In relation to RQ1, I suggest a possible path diagram in figure 1. In this 
diagram, life cycle potentially has two effects on IPO mispricing. In the first effect, 
life cycle is deemed to affect IPO pricing through the accrual and cash flow 
components of earnings. In this regard, evidence from life cycle theory (Black 1998, 
Liu 2008) suggests that growth firms are associated with high accruals and low cash 
flows from operations in a fundamental way even without earnings management. 
Specifically, growth firms use cash flows from operations to finance growth in 
working capital accounts (higher inventories, higher receivables, etc) prior to listing. 
Thus, higher accruals and lower cash flows from operations make IPO firms prone to 
mispricing in line with Sloan (1996). If this is so, the importance of life cycle in 
explaining returns diminishes when accruals and cash flows are included, consistent 
with first (topmost) path in figure 1.  
In the second effect, life cycle stage is deemed to affect the risk associated with 
firms rather than affecting earnings components. Such an effect might be supported if, 
for instance, young, high growth firms tend to be very risky. Myers’ (1977) 
                                                                                                                                                                       
efforts are likely to result in future earnings opportunities or earnings streams that are different from 
currently existing ones. Using this argument, mispricing of growth and decline IPOs could be 
associated with earnings-based explanations. However, such a conclusion assumes that investors have 
little difficulty estimating the riskiness (say) of growth and decline stage IPOs, which is another 
possible source of mispricing. Since there is no theory to support this, I make no predictions about the 





characterization of a firm’s value as comprising the value of assets-in-place and the 
value of growth opportunities suggests that this will often be the case. In particular, 
growth opportunities may not materialize or may differ from expectations. This would 
explain the high risk associated with growth firms whose value mainly derives from 
growth opportunities. Similarly, decline-stage firms are likely to be very risky in that 
management’s efforts to revive a declining firm might fail leading to bankruptcy. On 
the other hand, mature firms might be considered less risky in this regard since they 
are in a steady-state with stable sources of cash flows and profitable operations. If life 
cycle has a role in IPO mispricing beyond its effect on earnings components (e.g., 
through risk), I expect the life cycle variables to load when both the life cycle and 
earnings variables are included as independent variables in a regression explaining 
post-IPO returns [see equations (6) and (7)]. Thus, finding that life cycle has 
incremental explanatory power beyond accruals and cash flows would support the 
second path in figure 1.  
To explore RQ2, I examine whether my main tests (H2 through H4) produce 
different results for firms in different life cycle stages. This involves running my main 
tests (timing, association, and combined) for each life cycle stage (growth, maturity, 
and decline).         
3. Tests and research design  
To minimize the potential for ambiguity when describing my tests, definitions 





IPO date                : The date when the stocks of an IPO firm are first sold to the 
public. 
Industry of a firm  : Fama-French industry classification to which the firm belongs. 
Size of IPO firm    : Total assets of an IPO firm at the last reporting date before the 
IPO date. This is the level of total assets in the financial 
statements provided with the IPO prospectus. 
Return window      : Period for which returns are measured. 
Annual window     : For an IPO firm, the annual window refers to the period 
beginning 1 day after the IPO date through 250 trading days. 
For a matched non-IPO firm, the annual window corresponds 
to the annual window for the corresponding IPO firm.  
Announcement      : 
window                   
12-day period comprising four 3-day quarterly earnings 
announcement windows within the annual window. Each 
quarterly announcement window is constructed to begin (end) 
with the day before (after) the quarterly earnings 
announcement date. 
Non-announcement: 
window            
Period comprising all days in the annual window which are not 
included in the announcement window. 
Abnormal returns  : Size-adjusted returns of a firm, constructed by subtracting the 





from the raw returns of the firm.  
I describe the tests in the following paragraphs. 
3.1. Initial assessment: IPO overpricing and the accrual anomaly 
 This test compares the post-IPO performance (mean abnormal returns) of IPO 
firms with that of non-IPO firms matched on size and industry under the following 
two scenarios: (1) without controlling for accruals and cash flows, and (2) after 
controlling for accruals and cash flows.  Thus, I propose to estimate the following 




 = a1 + b1IPOi + εi1                                                                                                 (1) 
ARi
(post)
 = a2 + b2IPOi + c2[ACC_Ranki] + d2[CF_Ranki]  +  εi2                          (2)
ARi
(post)




IPOi                 =                   indicator variable which is equal to 1 if firm i is an IPO firm and 0 
if it is a non-IPO firm;  
ACC_Ranki    = decile rank
19





for firm i in the pre-IPO year less the mean decile rank (4.5), 
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 Whenever they are used, superscripts denote the point in time at which or the period of time over 
which the corresponding variable is measured, relative to the IPO date. For example, the superscript 
“(post)” used for abnormal returns indicates that the abnormal returns are measured over the year 
immediately following the IPO date. Similarly, the superscript “(pre)” which is used for the accrual, 
cash flow and total assets variables indicates that these variables are measured for the annual “reporting 
period” ending immediately before the IPO date. Financial statements for this most recent annual 






divided by 9; 
20
 





] for firm i in the pre-IPO year less the mean decile rank 
(4.5), divided by 9; 
CFi
(pre)                 
= operating cash flows of firm i measured for the last reporting 
period before the IPO date. This is the amount of operating cash 




        = accruals of firm i measured for the last reporting period before the 
IPO date. This is measured as the difference between earnings 






           = total assets of firm i measured at the last reporting date before the 
IPO date. This is the level of total assets in the financial statements 
provided with the IPO prospectus; 
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 Subtracting the mean rank effectively centers the ranks on zero. For a discussion of the benefits of 
centering, see Hunton et. al (2005).  
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 My definition of accruals as “total accruals” is consistent with Sloan (1996) except that Sloan (1996) 
uses differences in balance sheet accounts to estimate accruals whereas I estimate accruals by 
subtracting operating cash flows reported in the statement of cash flows from earnings. Some studies 
use “abnormal” accruals rather than total accruals (Xie 2006, Cheng and Thomas 2006), arguing that 
Sloan’s (1996) anomaly is due primarily to abnormal accruals. I believe that total accruals capture the 







εin                          = error term (firm i, equation n). 
If the IPOs in my sample are overpriced relative to matched non-IPOs, I expect 
the coefficient “b1” in equation (1) to be significantly negative. Furthermore, if the 
overpricing of IPO firms reported at the end of the first day of public trading is a 
symptom caused by a broader mispricing of earnings components, I expect the 
hypothesis that c2 = d2 = 0 to be rejected.
22
  
3.2 Further assessment: understanding more about the role of accounting in IPO 
overpricing 
In this section, I discuss my main tests for understanding the role of accounting 
in IPO mispricing. These are the timing, association and combined tests. 
3.2.1 Timing test 
I apply this test to my sample of IPO firms to examine the timing of post-IPO 
abnormal returns. I assess the timing of post-IPO abnormal returns by estimating 
averages of the coefficients obtained from running firm-specific regressions of daily 
abnormal returns in the year following the IPO date on an indicator variable that 
distinguishes whether the day of the return is within the announcement window or 
within the non-announcement window.
23
 Thus, my model is: 
ARid
(post)
   = a3i + e3iAW  + εid3                                                                                               (3) 
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 To test the hypothesis that c2 = d2 =0, I use the sum of squared residuals (SSR) in models (1) and (2) 
and the related degrees of freedom to compute my test statistic (F-statistic). Refer to Wooldridge (2003) 
for a detailed discussion. 
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 The use of firm-specific, rather than pooled, regressions mitigates the risk of biased regression 






(post)   
= daily abnormal returns for firm i for day “d” in the year following the 
IPO date; 
AW         =            indicator variable which is equal to 1 if the day over which the daily 
abnormal return of firm i [ARid
(post)
] is measured falls in the 
announcement window and 0 if the day “d” falls in the non-
announcement window (the subscripts “i” and “d” on the indicator 
variable AW are omitted for brevity); 
εid3                = error term (firm i, day “d”, equation 3). 
If the negative abnormal returns, representing overpricing, are concentrated in 
the announcement window, I expect the average of the estimated firm-specific 
coefficients (ê3i) on the announcement window indicator variable to be significantly 
negative and the average of the firm-specific constants (a3i) to be trivial.  
3.2.2 Association test      
The association test examines the association between post-IPO abnormal 
returns and earnings components (accruals and cash flows) in the pre-IPO year. Thus, 
I estimate a pooled regression of abnormal returns in the year following each IPO on 
accrual and cash flow ranks in the pre-IPO year as follows: 
ARi
(post)





The variables are as defined for equations (1) and (2). If the hypothesis that c4 = d4 = 0 
is rejected, I consider the alternative form of H3 supported.
24
      
3.2.3 Combined test 
 In the combined test, I test whether the incremental return that is concentrated 
around post-IPO earnings announcement dates is associated with pre-IPO accruals and 
cash flow components of earnings. My model of the combined test is a regression of 
the firm-specific coefficient estimates (ê3i) from equation (3) onto the corresponding 
accruals and cash flows variables. Thus, the model for the combined test is: 
ê3i = a5 + δ5[ACC_Ranki] + η5[CF_Ranki]
 
 + εi5  
 
(5) 
where ê3i  is the firm-specific coefficient of firm i on the announcement window 
indicator variable (AW) from the timing test model in equation (3).  
If the alternative form of H4 is supported, I expect: (1) δ5 = η5= 0 to be 
rejected, and (2) a5 to be trivial. The following combinations of δ5 and η5 are likely to 
be observed:  (i) δ5 = 0 and η5 > 0, suggesting that cash flow ranks explain the 
magnitude of post-IPO returns occurring during the announcement window but 
accrual ranks do not, (ii) δ5 < 0 and η5 = 0, suggesting that accrual ranks explain 
announcement window post-IPO returns but cash flow ranks do not, and (iii) δ5 < 0 
and η5 > 0, suggesting that both accrual and cash flow ranks explain announcement 
window post-IPO abnormal returns. All three outcomes would be consistent with:     
(i) investors’ trading decisions at the IPO date failing to fully incorporate earnings 
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 To  test the hypothesis that c4 = d4 = 0, I do the following: (i) estimate the full model in equation (4) 
and record the corresponding sum of squared residuals (SSR) and, (ii) estimate a restricted model with 
only the constant and record the corresponding SSR. I then use the SSRs in (i) and (ii) to compute an  
F-statistic. To estimate the restricted model such as in (ii) above, I suppress the intercept and I run a 





components reported in pre-IPO financial statements, and (ii) the investors correcting 
this oversight when earnings are reported in the subsequent year. The specific pattern 
of the coefficients (δ5 and η5) will reveal which component of earnings investors fail 
to incorporate. Although a debate exists regarding which of the earnings components 
investors are more likely to fail to fully incorporate, I expect cash flows rather than 
accruals to explain announcement window post-IPO returns based on evidence from 
Armstrong et al. (2009).        
3.3 Role of life cycle stage 
As stated earlier, my sample of IPOs includes growth firms, mature firms, and 
decline firms (refer to section 2.2.3 for a brief explanation of why mature and decline 
firms might go public). Although life cycle has been suggested as a possible 
explanation for the mispricing of IPOs, its role is largely unexplored.  I envision two 
possible roles for life cycle. First life cycle could affect the level of accruals and cash 
flows which in turn affect IPO mispricing. Alternatively, life cycle might affect risk 
which leads to mispricing when market participants fail to accurately estimate the risk 
associated with IPOs.   
Thus, to examine the role of life cycle stage in the performance of IPO firms, I 
divide my sample IPO firms into growth-, mature- and decline-stage firms (Anthony 
and Ramesh 1992, Hribar and Yehuda 2008).
25
 Then, I use the life cycles to 
investigate (i) whether life cycle has any effect of IPO mispricing other than its effect 
on accruals and cash flow ranks (RQ1), and (ii) whether life cycle affects the form 
(earnings vs. other) of mispricing (RQ2). In relation to RQ1, I estimate the earlier 
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regressions involving earnings components (regression model 4 and regression model 
5) using two scenarios. In the first scenario, I use life cycle indicator variables in place 
of the earnings components. In the second scenario, I include life cycle variables 
together with the earnings components. The indicator variable GROWTH (DECLINE) 
is equal to 1 if the IPO firm is in the growth (decline) stage and 0 otherwise. The 
mature stage (omitted) is the baseline.  
Scenario 1: Here I substitute the life cycle variables (GROWTH, DECLINE) for the 
earnings components in equations (4) and (5). Thus, 
ARi
(post)
 = a6 + f6GROWTHi + h6DECLINEi + εi6                                                           (6) 
ê3i = a7 + f7GROWTHi + h7DECLINEi + εi7  
 
 (7) 
All variables are as defined for equations (1) through (5). 
Rejecting f6 = h6 = 0 in equation (6) above suggests that mean post-IPO 
abnormal returns vary across the life cycle stages. However, the question as to whether 
life cycle affects IPO pricing directly or only indirectly by affecting accrual and cash 
ranks (RQ1) remains unanswered despite the rejection of f6 = h6 = 0. Likewise, 
rejecting f7 = h7 = 0 in equation (7) suggests that the average of the firm-specific 
announcement window coefficients, ê3i, vary across the life cycle stages but falls short 
of informing us whether the effect of life cycle is direct or occurs only indirectly by 
affecting the accrual and cash flow ranks. To address this, I use both the life cycle 
variables and the earnings variables (accrual and cash flow ranks) in the same 





Scenario 2: Here, I include the life cycle variables together with the earnings 
components in equations (4) and (5), resulting in equations (8) and (9). Equations (8) 
and (9) address the limitation noted in equations (6) and (7). In other words, I can now 
examine whether life cycle has any effect on IPO mispricing beyond its effect on 
earnings components (RQ1).  
ARi
(post)
 = a8 + c8ACC_Ranki + d8CF_Ranki + f8GROWTHi + h8DECLINEi 
+ εi8   
 
(8) 
ê3i = a9+ δ9[ACC_Ranki] + η9[CF_Ranki]
 
 + f9GROWTHi + 




If life cycle has any effect on IPO mispricing beyond its effect on earnings 
components (RQ1), I expect f8 = h8 = 0 and f9 = h9 = 0 to be rejected.    
Finally to examine whether life cycle moderates the form of mispricing (i.e. 
earnings-based versus other explanations for IPO mispricing) as in RQ2, I re-estimate 
models (3) through (5) for each life cycle stage and test whether my inferences about 
which explanation for IPO mispricing (earnings-based vs. other) change across the life 
cycle stages.  
4. Sample 
I draw my initial sample of IPO firms from the Field-Ritter datasets of IPO 
founding dates available on Jay Ritter’s website 
(http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm). The initial sample comprises 7,477 firms 





IPOs that took place before 1988 since firms were not required to provide cash flow 
data (a key variable in my tests) prior to 1988. I obtain my final sample of 5,338 IPO 
firms after excluding: (i) firms which could not be found on Compustat (1,094),       
(ii) firms missing pre-IPO data on Compustat (734), (iii) firms with pre-IPO data on 
Compustat but with missing values for key Compustat variables (297), (iv) firms not 
found on CRSP (10), and (v) repeat IPOs (4). My sample selection is summarized in 
table 1, panel A. Panel B summarizes the industry composition of the final 5,338 
firms. Finally, panel C provides a distribution of the 5,338 firms by IPO year. For tests 
incorporating life cycle, the sample is further reduced to 3,503 firms after excluding 
IPO firms with missing pre-IPO values of the variables required to classify firms into 
life cycles (dividend payout ratio, sales growth, firm age, capital expenditure and total 
assets).   
Table 2 provides summary statistics of selected variables for the full sample of 
5,338 firms. The full sample of 5,338 IPO firms has a mean (median) of:  (i) -0.31      
(-0.16) for mean annual post-IPO abnormal returns, (ii) -0.08 (-0.06) for total accruals 
deflated by total assets, (iii) -0.07 (0.04) for operating cash flows deflated by total 
assets, (iv) 19.4 % (0.0%) for dividend payout ratio, (v) 111% (19 %) for sales growth, 
(vi) 0.08 (0.06) for capital expenditure deflated by total assets, and (vii) 14.3 (8.0) for 






5.1 Initial assessment: IPO overpricing and the accrual anomaly 
The initial assessment uses a sample of 5,338 IPO firms and 5,338 matched 
non-IPO firms. Table 3 (panel A) provides a correlation matrix for the IPO variable 
and the ranks for accruals and cash flows. As expected, IPOs are associated with 
higher accrual ranks and lower cash flow ranks.   
Table 3 (panel B) presents the results of my initial assessment of the 
overpricing of IPO stocks. Specifically, the results in model (1) represent a pooled 
regression of annual abnormal returns on an IPO indicator variable (IPO=1 if the firm 
is an IPO firm; 0 otherwise), including both IPO firms and size- and industry-matched 
non-IPO firms in the regression. In this regression, the coefficient on the IPO indicator 
variable (b1 = -0.131, t = -4.88) suggests that my sample IPO firms underperform 
relative to matched non-IPO firms by about 13% in the year immediately following 
the IPO date. In economic terms, this means that a trading strategy of selling short the 
stocks of IPO firms and buying stocks of matched non-IPO firms at the end of the IPO 
date would result in buy-and-hold returns of 13% in the post-IPO year.
26
  
Model (2) in table 3 (panel B), which examines a possible role of earnings 
components in the overpricing of stocks of IPO firms at the end of the first day of 
trading, confirms the finding in model (1) that IPO firms underperform relative to 
matched non-IPO firms by about 13 % (b2 = -0.132, t = -4.35). The coefficients on the 
accruals variable (c2 = 0.056, t = 1.26) and the cash flows variable (d2 = 0.245,             
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 This is consistent with Ritter (1991) who finds a first year differential of 10% between returns of IPO 






t = 5.38) in model (2) suggest a role for earnings components, particularly cash flows, 
in explaining post-IPO returns. In fact, table 3 (panel C) shows that the joint 
hypothesis of c2 = d2 = 0 is rejected (F = 234.81 vs. a critical value of 3.00 at a 5% 
level of significance). Thus, since accruals and cash flows explain post-IPO returns, 
we cannot rule out the possibility that the IPO anomaly might be linked to the wider 
anomaly in Sloan (1996). 
5.2 Further assessment: understanding more about the role of accounting in IPO 
overpricing 
Table 4 presents the results of the timing, association and combined tests for 
my full sample of IPO firms.
27
 Recall that the timing test [model (3)] represents a 
regression of daily abnormal returns on an indicator variable AW (=1 if the day of the 
return lies within the announcement window, 0 otherwise). The association test [model 
(4)] represents a regression of annual post-IPO abnormal returns on pre-IPO accruals 
and cash flows ranks. Finally, the combined test [model (5)] represents a regression of 
the firm-specific coefficients on the AW variable from model (3) on pre-IPO accruals 
and cash flows variables.
28
  
5.2.1 Timing test  
In column 2 of table 4, I present the averages of the firm-specific intercepts 
and coefficients from regression model (3). To be specific, the average of the firm-
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 Any attempt to compare the intercepts and coefficients across columns must be done with caution for 
the following reasons: (i) the dependent variables differ across columns, and (ii) the models do not 
include the same variables.  
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 In simulation results not presented in this paper, I find that the coefficients on the accruals and cash 
flows variables in the firm-specific version of the combined test [ê3i = a5 + δ5(ACC_Ranki)                    
+ η5(CF_Ranki)
 
 + εi5]  correspond to the coefficients δ5  and η5 in the pooled regression, ARid
(post)
  = a5  
+ (c5+δ5AW)ACC_Ranki + (d5 + η5AW)CF_Ranki
 
 + e5AW  +
 
εid5. This latter equation is an alternative 





specific coefficients, ê3i, on the announcement window indicator variable (AW) is 
significantly negative (ê3i = -0.00148, t = -4.70). This evidence suggests that in the 
year immediately subsequent to the IPO date, abnormal returns of my sample IPO 
firms are concentrated in the announcement window. Based on the intercept and 
coefficient in model (3), the cumulative returns in the announcement (non-
announcement) window is approximately -2.3% (-10.5%). On the other hand, the 
announcement (non-announcement) window is 12 (238) days in length. The returns in 
the announcement window are about 22% of the returns in the non-announcement 
window even though the length of announcement window is only about 5% the length 
of the non-announcement window. Clearly, there is a disproportionate amount of 
negative returns in the announcement window, consistent with an earnings-based 
explanation. 
5.2.2 Association test  
Recall that negative abnormal returns concentrated in the announcement 
window are not considered conclusive evidence in separating earnings-based 
explanations of the end-of-first-day overpricing of the stocks of IPO firms from other 
explanations (e.g., risk-based explanations and fads). The association test provides 
additional evidence that potentially makes one explanation (earnings-based vs. other) 
more plausible and the alternative explanation more difficult to formulate. In 
particular, if post-IPO abnormal returns are associated with pre-IPO earnings 
components, this makes an earnings-based explanation for IPO mispricing more 
plausible than other explanations. Column 3 of table 4[model (4)] presents the results 





are negatively associated with post-IPO annual abnormal returns (c4 = -0.027,              
t = -1.98) while cash flow ranks are positively associated with post-IPO abnormal 
returns (d4 = 0.240, t = 3.52) suggesting that post-IPO abnormal returns are associated 
with pre-IPO accrual and cash flow ranks.  
In table 4, I also present the results of my test of the hypotheses that c4 = d4 = 0. 
In this table, c4 = d4 = 0 is rejected (F = 21.48 vs. a critical value of 3.00 at a 5% level 
of significance). Thus, the association test results for the full sample support an 
earnings-based explanation.  
5.2.3 Combined test  
As a reminder, the combined test examines the association between post-IPO 
returns and earnings components within the earnings announcement window. Table 4 
(model 5) presents my results for the combined test. Specifically, results in table 4 
suggest that I should reject the hypothesis that δ5 = η5 = 0 for my full sample of IPO 
firms (F = 86.88 vs. a critical value of 3.00 at a 5% level of significance). This implies 
that, on average, investors adjust expectations of future earnings based on accruals and 
cash flows information reported during the earnings announcement window. 
Furthermore, table 4 shows that the coefficient on cash flow ranks is positive and 
significant at the 5% level (η5 = 0.00346, t = 3.24) and the coefficient on accruals 
ranks is positive but insignificant at the 5% level (δ5 = 0.0212, t = 1.88). These results 
imply that, on average, the overpricing of IPO is due to the accrual anomaly, with cash 
flows subsuming accruals in explaining announcement window abnormal returns. This 
is consistent with Armstrong et al. (2009) who document evidence that when cash 





the combined test results for my full sample of IPOs support an earnings-based 
explanation for the overpricing of IPOs.    
 In summary, the results of my main tests (timing, association, and combined 
tests) support an earnings-based explanation for my full sample of IPO firms. That is, 
for the full sample, mispricing of IPOs seems consistent with failure to fully 
incorporate the implications of pre-IPO earnings components for future earnings. In 
subsequent subsections, I present results of tests aimed at understanding the role of life 
cycle stage in overpricing of IPOs. 
5.3 Role of life cycle stage 
Table 5 provides summary statistics for the life cycle sample. Out of the life 
cycle sample of 3,503 IPO firms, 1,917 firms are classified as growth firms, 1,098 as 
mature firms and 488 as decline firms. Thus, within my sample, growth stage IPOs 
outnumber non-growth (mature and decline) IPOs. In addition, growth IPOs have 
higher mean accruals deflated by total assets (-0.06 vs.-0.09 and -0.07) and lower cash 
flows deflated by total assets (0.01 vs. 0.12 and 0.10), relative to mature and decline 
IPOs. The distribution of the mean dividend payout ratios, mean sales growth rates, 
mean capital expenditure deflated by total assets and mean age of the firms across life 
cycle stage reflects my criteria for classifying sample IPO firms into life cycles.  
Table 6 and table 7 present the results of the tests I employ to explore the role 






 5.3.1 Does life cycle have any effect on IPO mispricing beyond its effect on earnings 
components (RQ1)? 
Recall that the approach I adopt to investigate RQ1 involves an examination of 
whether life cycle explains post-IPO abnormal returns and/or the average of the firm-
specific announcement window coefficients, ê3i. In particular, I re-estimate models (4) 
and (5) under the following two scenarios: (i) using life cycle variables instead of 
accruals and cash flow ranks, and (ii) using life cycle variables together with accruals 
and cash flow ranks.  
Column 2 of table 6 shows that the coefficients on the life cycle indicator 
variables are both statistically insignificant at the 5% level (f6=0.078, t=1.29; 
h6=0.022, t=0.34). Column 4 of table 6 presents the results for regression model (8)
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that includes both life cycle and earnings variables. The lifecycle coefficients            
(f8 = 0.044, t = 0.74; h8 = 0.119, t = 1.85) and the accruals coefficient (c8 = -0.035,       
t = -0.59) are insignificant while the cash flow coefficient (d8 = 0.623, t = 10.02) is 
significant. Thus, the results in column 4 of table 6 are in line with the evidence from 
column 2. That is, life cycle does not explain post-IPO abnormal returns, whether used 
alone in a regression or with accruals and cash flow ranks. Later in table 6, I fail to 
reject the hypothesis that  f6 = h6 = 0 (F = 1.46 vs. a critical value of 3.00 at a 5% level 
of significance). Likewise, I fail to reject f8 = h8 = 0 (F = 2.34 vs. a critical value of 
3.00 at a 5% level of significance). Thus, I find no evidence that life cycle explains 
post-IPO abnormal returns for my sample firms.  
                                                          
29
 Note that the differences between the estimates in models (4) and (8) are partly due to differences in 
sample composition. Model (4) uses my full sample of 5,338 IPO firms whereas model (8) uses only the 





In columns 3 and 5 of table 6, the lifecycle variables are insignificant                
(f7= -0.00016, t= -0.14; h7= -0.00123, t= -0.94; f9=-0.00042, t= -0.36; h9=-0.001,            
t= -0.76) while accruals (δ9 = -0.00274, t = -2.21) and cash flows (η9 = 0.00311,           
t = 2.50) are significant. In addition, I fail to reject the hypothesis that f7 = h7 = 0       
(F = 2.74 vs. a critical value of 3.00 at a 5% level of significance equivalent). 
Similarly, I cannot reject f9 = h9 = 0 (F = 1.87 vs. a critical value of 3.00 at a 5% level 
of significance). Thus, I find no evidence that life cycle explains post-IPO abnormal 
returns and/or announcement window returns, whether life cycle is used alone or with 
earnings components in a regression. 
5.3.2 How does life cycle stage affect the likelihood of earnings-based explanations 
and other explanations (RQ2)? 
 Recall that to answer RQ2, I re-estimate models (3) through (5), using only 
firms in the growth, mature, and decline stages in turn. Next, I examine whether my 
inference about the most likely explanation (earnings-based vs. other) for IPO 
mispricing changes across life cycle stage. Table 7 presents my results. I discuss the 
results in the following sections. 
5.3.2.1 Growth Stage 
 For sample IPO firms in the growth stage, I find evidence in table 7 (panel A) 
that: 
(i) Timing test: post-IPO abnormal returns are concentrated around earnings 





(ii) Association test: pre-IPO earnings variables (particularly cash flow ranks) 
are associated with post-IPO abnormal returns (c11 = -0.0353, t = -0.36;           
 11 = 0.274, t = 2.69). In addition, the joint hypothesis that c11 = d11 = 0 is 
rejected (F = 13.6 vs. a critical value of 3.00 at the 5% level of 
significance). 
(iii) Combined test: pre-IPO earnings variables (in particular, cash flow ranks) 
can explain announcement window returns (δ12 = 0.00231, t = 1.47;         
η12 = 0.00493, t = 3.09). The joint hypothesis that δ 12= η 12 = 0 is rejected         
(F = 35.6 vs. a critical value of 3.00 at the 5% level of significance). 
In summary, for my sample firms that are in the growth stage, IPO overpricing 
seems to be consistent with earnings-based explanations rather than with other 
explanations.  
5.3.2.2 Mature Stage 
For mature stage sample IPO firms, the results of my main tests for 
distinguishing between earnings-based and other explanations (table 7, panel B) are: 
(i) Timing test: post-IPO abnormal returns are not concentrated around 
earnings announcements (ê10i = -0.00114, t = -1.57); 
(ii) Association test: pre-IPO earnings variables (in particular, cash flow ranks) 
are associated with post-IPO abnormal returns (c11 = -0.0678, t = -0.36;       
 11 = 0.397, t = 2.22). The joint hypothesis that c11 = d11 = 0 is rejected          





(iii) Combined test: pre-IPO accrual and cash flow ranks cannot explain 
announcement window returns (δ12 = 0.00274, t=1.01; η12 = -0.00265,             
t = -1.09). I fail to reject the joint hypothesis that δ 12= η 12 = 0 (F = 0.73 vs. 
a critical value of 3.00 at the 5% level of significance). 
In summary, results from the timing and combined tests do not support an 
earnings-based explanation for IPO mispricing. In fact, t-statistics for both the 
constant term and the AW variable in the second column of panel B of table 7 (timing 
test) suggest that mispricing of mature IPOs, if any, is minimal.   
5.3.2.3 Decline Stage        
For sample IPO firms in the decline stage, the results of my main tests for 
distinguishing between earnings-based and other explanations (table 7, panel C) are: 
(i) Timing test: post-IPO abnormal returns are concentrated around earnings 
announcements (ê10i = -0.00238, t = -3.62). 
(ii) Association test: pre-IPO cash flow (accrual) ranks are (are not) associated 
with post-IPO abnormal returns ( 11= 0.405, t = 2.09; c11 = -0.0190,            
t = -0.81). I reject the joint hypothesis that c11= d11= 0 (F = 5.6 vs. a critical 
value of 3.00 at the 5% level of significance). 
(iii) Combined test: pre-IPO accrual and cash flow ranks cannot explain 
announcement window returns (δ11 = 0.00296, t = 1.14; η11 = -0.00036,           
t = -0.13). I fail to reject the joint hypothesis that δ 12= η 12 = 0 (F = 1.16 vs. 





Thus, I find mixed results regarding the role of earnings in explaining the 
mispricing of decline stage IPO firms. To be specific, the timing and association tests 
are consistent with an earnings-based explanation. However, the combined test does 
not support an earnings-based explanation. 
 In summary, I find evidence that the mispricing of my growth-stage sample 
IPO firms is consistent with earnings-based explanations. On the other hand, 
mispricing of mature-stage sample IPO firms, if any, is not consistent with earnings-
based explanations. As for decline-stage sample IPO firms, I find mixed evidence. 
Specifically, the timing and association tests point toward earnings-based explanations 
whereas the combined test does not support earnings-based explanations. 
5.4 Results of Additional Tests  
To address concerns that my results may have been affected by the choice of 
return window used in my tests (12 months), I repeat the main tests using a longer 
window of 36 months.
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 Thus, the timing test now uses daily abnormal returns and 
announcement windows measured over the 36-month period beginning the day after 
the IPO date. The association test uses 36-month cumulative abnormal returns from 
the day after the IPO date and examines whether or not these returns are associated 
with accrual and cash flow components in the IPO financial statements. Similarly, the 
combined test is now based on a 36-month return window instead of a 12-month 
(annual) window. I repeat the main tests for both my full sample and my life cycle 
sample of IPO firms. 
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5.4.1 Full sample tests 
Table 8 presents the results of the timing, association and combined tests using 
my full sample of 5,338 IPO firms and a return window of 36 months subsequent to 
the IPO date.  
5.4.1.1 Timing test  
Table 8 (column 2) presents the results of the timing test for the full sample of 
IPOs but using a returns window of 36 months instead of 12 months. In this table, 
average daily abnormal returns in the announcement window are -0.0018 and -0.00039 
in the non-announcement window. Remember that using a 36-month window, the 
announcement (non-announcement window) is 36 (714) days long. Thus total 
announcement (non-announcement) window returns are -6.5% (-27.8%). In other 
words, announcement window returns are about 23% of the non-announcement 
window returns. On the other hand, the announcement window is only 5% of the non-
announcement window in length. In other words, for the full sample of IPOs, returns 
are concentrated in the announcement window. Thus, the alternate form of H2 is 
supported.  
5.4.1.2 Association test 
Association test results are presented in column 3 of table 8. The intercept is    
-0.455 (t = -2.36), the coefficient on the accruals variable is -0.188 (t = -0.15), and the 
coefficient on the cash flow variable is 0.778 (t = 2.76). The higher intercept relative 
to the 12-month return window is partly due to the longer return window resulting in 
higher total returns. Thus, cash flows in the IPO financial statement are associated 





hypothesis that c4 = d4 = 0 (implying that accruals and cash flows in IPO financial 
statements are not associated with 36-month post-IPO returns) is rejected (F-statistic  
= 11.1 vs. a critical value of 3.00 at the 5% level of significance). This suggests that 
IPO mispricing results from failure to fully incorporate the implication of earnings 
components in IPO financial statements for future earnings.   
5.4.1.3 Combined test 
Combined test results are shown in column 4 of table 8. In this case the 
coefficient on the accruals variable is 0.00026 (t = 0.39) and that on the cash flow 
variable is 0.0235 (t = 3.80). In addition, the hypothesis that δ5 = η5 = 0 is rejected    
(F-statistic = 19.6 vs. a critical value of 3.00 at the 5% level of significance). This 
suggests that the association between abnormal returns and earnings components is 
different in the announcement window than in the non-announcement window. Thus, 
the alternate form of H3 is supported.  
In summary, all the main tests using a 36-month return window support an 
earnings-based explanation on average (i.e. for the full sample of IPOs). This is 
consistent with the findings using a 12 month return window. 
5.4.2 Life cycle sample tests 
As before, these tests are restricted to the 3,503 firms with enough data to be 
classified into life cycle stages. However, I now use a 36-month return window.  The 
results are presented in table 9. In summary, the results are as follows: 
5.4.2.1 Growth Firms Only 





5.4.2.1.1 Timing test 
For growth IPOs, post-IPO abnormal returns are concentrated around earnings 
announcements: intercept (a10) is equal to -0.00038 (t = -3.81) and the coefficient on 
the indicator variable AW (ê10i) is -0.00146 (t = -3.73). Thus, announcement window 
returns are about 24% of non-announcement window returns. In other words, 
abnormal returns are concentrated in the announcement window (alternate form of H2 
is supported).  
5.4.2.1.2 Association test 
For growth IPOs, the coefficient on the accrual variable is -0.327 (t = -2.13) 
and that on the cash flow variable is 0.950 (t = 6.05). Thus, both accruals and cash 
flows are associated with 36-month post-IPO abnormal returns. In fact, the joint 
hypothesis of c11 = d11 = 0 is rejected (F = 19.8 vs. a critical value of 3.00 at a 5% 
level of significance). In other words, the alternate form of H3 is supported, consistent 
with an earnings-based explanation. 
5.4.2.1.3 Combined test 
 Firm-specific coefficients on the announcement window indicator variable 
(AW) are associated with cash flow ranks (η12 = 0.0016, t = 1.96) but not with accrual 
ranks (δ12 = 0.00043, t = 0.55). I reject the joint hypothesis that η12 = δ12 = 0 (F = 12.9 
vs. a critical value of 3.00 at a 5% level of significance). Thus, the alternate form of 
H4 (that the association between earnings components in IPO financial statements and 





announcement window) is supported. This suggests an earnings-based explanation for 
the mispricing of growth IPOs. 
In summary, all the main tests support an earnings-based explanation for the 
mispricing of growth IPOs. This is the same conclusion that follows from using a    
12-month return window.  
5.4.2.2 Mature Firms Only 
Results for mature stage IPOs using a 36-month return window are presented 
in table 9 (panel B).  
5.4.2.2.1 Timing test 
Results for the timing test suggest that earnings are not concentrated around 
earnings announcements (intercept = -0.00039, t = -3.61; ê10i = -0.00140, t = -1.15). In 
other words, earnings-based explanations are not supported. 
5.4.2.2.2 Association test 
The association test results show that cash flow ranks (d11 = 1.244, t = 3.33) 
are associated with 36-month post-IPO returns but accruals are not (c11 = -0.206,         
t = -0.56). The joint hypothesis that c11 = d11 = 0 is rejected (F = 16.7 vs. a critical 
value of 3.00 at a 5% level of significance). This supports the alternate form of H3. 
5.4.2.2.3 Combined test 
The coefficient on the accruals variable (δ12 = 0.00093, t = 0.38) and the cash 
flow variable (η12 = 0.0016, t = 0.74) are both insignificant. The joint hypothesis that 





significance). Thus, the association between 36-month post-IPO returns and the 
earnings components in IPO financial statements is not different in the announcement 
window than in the non-announcement window (null form of H4 is not rejected).  
To summarize, the results in table 9 (panel B) suggest that mispricing of 
mature IPOs is consistent with factors other than earnings. This is the same conclusion 
I arrived at using a 12-month return window.  
5.4.2.3 Decline Firms Only 
Panel C of table 9 presents the results for decline firms using a 36-month 
return window. 
5.4.2.3.1 Timing test 
For IPOs in the decline stage, post-IPO abnormal returns are concentrated 
around earnings announcements. Specifically, the intercept is -0.00040 (t = -5.23) and 
the coefficient on the indicator variable AW (ê10i) is -0.00152 (t = -2.86). 
Announcement window returns are about 24% of non-announcement window returns. 
In other words, abnormal returns are concentrated in the announcement window 
(alternate form of H2 is supported). 
5.4.2.3.2 Association test 
 Here, earnings components in IPO financial statements (in particular, cash 
flow ranks) are associated with post-IPO abnormal returns (c11 = -0.129, t = -0.48;   
 11 = 1.105, t = 3.76). The joint hypothesis that c11 = d11 = 0 is rejected (F = 10.4 vs. a 
critical value of 3.00 at a 5% level of significance) suggesting a role for earnings 





5.4.2.3.3 Combined test 
The coefficient on the accruals variable (δ12 = 0.0025, t = 1.20) and the cash 
flow variable (η12 = 0.0033, t = 1.57) are both insignificant. In addition, the joint 
hypothesis that η12 = δ12 = 0 cannot be rejected (F = 2.1 vs. a critical value of 3.00 at a 
5% level of significance). This implies that the association between returns and IPO 
earnings components is not different in the announcement window than in the non-
announcement window (null form of H4 is not rejected).  
To summarize, the both the timing and association test results in panel C of 
table 9 support earnings-based explanations for the mispricing of decline stage IPOs. 
However, the combined test suggests factors other than earnings. This is consistent 
with the conclusions made using 12-month returns. Thus, I find no evidence to suggest 
that my results are materially affected by the use of a 12-month return window.  
6. Conclusion 
In this study, I examine a potential role for accounting information and Sloan’s 
(1996) accrual anomaly to explain the overpricing of IPO stocks observed at the end 
of the first day of trading. Sloan’s (1996) accrual anomaly refers to evidence that 
accruals are overpriced and/or cash flows underpriced. Prior studies provide 
conflicting conclusions regarding the cause of the long-run poor stock price 
performance of IPOs and the related overpricing.  For example, Teoh et al. (1998a, 
1998b) suggest that accounting information (high accruals) may contribute to the 
overpricing (as in Sloan 1996). In particular, Teoh et al. (1998a, 1998b) attribute the 
high level of discretionary accruals to earnings management. Liu (2008) provides 





1998b) are misspecified resulting in a positive bias in discretionary accrual estimates 
for growth firms. She concludes that IPO firms have high working capital accruals due 
to life cycle stage rather than earnings management. Armstrong et al. (2009) report 
evidence that after controlling for known biases, discretionary accrual estimates of 
IPO firms are (1) not statistically different from zero in the IPO year, and (2) unrelated 
to measures of managerial incentives to inflate IPO earnings. On the other hand, Healy 
and Palepu (1990) suggest that the overpricing is a consequence of risk changes 
around the IPO date which are not incorporated into investors’ pricing decisions at the 
IPO date. I address the issue of which of the two explanations (earnings-based vs. 
other) is more plausible. To distinguish between earnings-based and other 
explanations, I employ the methodology of Bernard et al (1997) which involves an 
examination of post-IPO abnormal returns. Finally, I examine the role of life-cycle 
stage in the IPO pricing anomaly. 
In tests using my full sample of IPO firms, I find evidence that the overpricing 
of IPO stocks recorded at the end of the first day of public trading is consistent with 
earnings-based explanations. These findings are at odds with Healy and Palepu (1990) 
who look for an earnings effect but find none.    
Regarding the role of life cycle, I do not find any evidence that life cycle stage 
explains post-IPO abnormal returns, whether used alone or together with accruals and 
cash flow ranks. However, I find evidence that life cycle may explain the form of 
mispricing. In particular, I report evidence that the mispricing of growth- (mature-) 
stage sample IPO firms is (is not) consistent with earnings-based explanations. 





as follows: (i) the timing and association tests suggest that earnings-based 
explanations are more likely than other explanations, and (ii) the combined test results 
are inconsistent with earnings-based explanations. Thus, for decline stage IPO firms, 
earnings appear to play an important role in the mispricing. However, the results of 
combined test suggest that the role of earnings in the mispricing of these decline stage 
firms is not entirely consistent with Sloan’s (1996) anomaly.   
These results raise questions that could be considered for possible future 
research. For example, why is it that market participants seemingly do a poor job of 
using earnings to predict future prospects of growth- and decline-stage IPO firms 
when the opposite appears to be true for mature IPO firms? Does this extend to all 
growth and decline firms or is it limited to IPO settings? From regulators’ point of 
view, what disclosures might help financial statement users to accurately predict 
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Appendix I: Risk as an alternative to earnings-based explanations for IPO 
mispricing 
Risk provides an alternative to earnings as an explanation for IPO mispricing. I 
consider two possible types of risk-based explanations for the evidence of overpricing 
of IPOs: researcher errors and market errors. If a researcher fails to consider some 
important risk factors (e.g., size of a firm) when estimating the risk associated with 
IPO firms and if the errors are predominantly positive, then the researcher’s estimates 
of expected returns will be too high, which produces spurious negative post-IPO 
abnormal returns. This could lead the researcher to conclude that stocks of IPO firms 
are overpriced when they are not. The biased abnormal returns resulting from 
researcher errors are likely to be spread uniformly across time (e.g., each additional 
day in the cumulation period induces a little more bias). Consequently, evidence that 
negative abnormal returns are not concentrated around earnings announcements but 
are spread across time would be consistent with researcher errors in estimating risk. 
The other type of risk-based explanation for overpricing of IPOs is that the 
market underestimates the risk associated with IPO firms.  If so, the subsequent 
upward adjustments of the risk estimates are likely to result in negative post-IPO 
abnormal returns. As an example, Healy and Palepu (1990) provide evidence of 
increases in the systematic risk of IPO firms around the IPO date and of the market 
apparently failing to incorporate these increases in systematic risk into pricing 





depend on how the market corrects its prior errors in estimating risk. One possibility is 
for the market to observe new information about risk continuously for each IPO firm; 
this leads to small abnormal returns each day following the IPO until the error is 
corrected.  This pattern will be similar to the abnormal return pattern predicted in the 
researcher-error explanation above.  
Another possibility is that the market observes information related to risk on 
specific days in a non-continuous (discrete) manner for each firm, in which case 
abnormal returns will be large on the day the market observes risk and zero on other 
days. In this scenario, the post-IPO abnormal returns could be clustered around post-
IPO earnings announcements if accounting information helps investors to learn about 
risk. Alternatively, if the market learns about risk discretely on random dates (e.g., 
through means other than future earnings), the abnormal returns of a portfolio of IPO 
firms will not be clustered. Instead, the portfolio abnormal returns pattern over time 
will be similar to the scenario where risk is observed continuously.  
Thus, evidence that negative abnormal returns are concentrated around post-
IPO earnings announcements would rule out a market-errors risk-based explanation 
where the errors are corrected continuously, but it does not rule out discrete 
corrections if future earnings announcements are important to revealing past errors in 
estimating risk. Discriminating between an earnings-based explanation and a risk-
based, discrete correction of market errors explanation requires a further test. 
Specifically, if the abnormal returns surrounding post-IPO earnings announcements 
are associated with the components in IPO earnings, then the evidence is inconsistent 





linked with the magnitude of pre-IPO earnings components. In summary, the tests I 
propose can distinguish between earnings-based and risk-based explanations by 





Appendix II: Life cycle measure (proxy) 
A major concern in studies incorporating life cycle of a firm is the lack of a 
universally accepted measure of life cycle stage.  For example, DeAngelo, DeAngelo 
and Stulz (2006) use the ratio of retained earnings to total equity as a proxy for life 
cycle. In this study, I use a life cycle measure based on Anthony and Ramesh (1992) 
and Liu (2008). I divide the life cycle of a firm into early growth, late growth, 
maturity, early decline and late decline stages using quintiles of a composite measure 
derived from rankings of dividend payout ratios, sales growth rates, capital 
expenditures (scaled by total assets) and firm’s age. Specifically, I first rank all 
Compustat firms (including my sample IPOs) within each industry and year based on 
dividend payout ratio, sales growth rate, capital expenditure, and age. Thus, each year, 
each Compustat firm has a within industry rank for each of these variables. Rankings 
for dividend payout ratio and firm age are assigned in such a way that the rank “1” is 
assigned to the firm with the lowest measure on the variable. On the other hand, 
rankings for sales growth rate and capital expenditure are made in such a way that the 
rank “1” is assigned to the firm with the highest measure on the variable. This way of 
assigning ranks ensures that after summing the ranks of each firm to get a composite 
measure of rank, the lowest (highest) score on the composite measure relates to early 
growth (late decline). In other words, the composite measure is increasing in life cycle 
stage. Within each industry and year, firms in the Compustat sample are divided into 
quintiles based on the composite measure. I classify quintile 1 as early growth, quintile 
2 as late growth, quintile 3 as mature, quintile 4 as early decline, and quintile 5 as late 





approach could result in all my IPOs being in the first quintile (all growth) but as 
reported in table 5, that does not happen.  
To enhance the power of my tests, I treat IPOs in life cycle quintile 1 of the 
Compustat universe as growth firms, IPOs in life cycle quintile 3 as mature firms, and 
IPOs in life cycle quintile 5 as decline firms. The table below summarizes the 
construction of my life cycle proxy. 
Within each industry and 
for each year, I perform 
the following steps: 
 
     
Step 1 (all firms): 










Step 2 (all firms): 












Step 3 (all firms):  










Step 4 (all firms): 









Step 5 (all firms): 
Sum the ranks in steps 1 
through 4 by firm to 
create a composite rank 
for each firm. Group the 
firms into quintiles based 













































Dividend payout ratio= annual dividend as a percentage of income before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations; 
Sales growth rate          = sales growth rate over the pre-IPO year; 
Capital expenditure   = capital expenditures, as a proportion of total assets; 
Firm age                    = The difference between the current year and the year in which the business 
was formed (or the year of incorporation if the year of formation is not 
available). If firms merge, the age of the merged firm is the larger of the 





Figure 1: Possible causes of IPO mispricing 










Life cycle potentially has two effects on IPO mispricing. To be specific, life cycle 
affects the relative proportions of earnings components. Life cycle also affects the 






Life cycle affects the 
relative proportions of 
accruals and cash flows. 
In turn the proportion of 
accruals and cash flows 
leads to IPO mispricing 
(e.g., Sloan 1996). 
Life cycle affects the 
riskiness of IPO firms 
and this leads to 
mispricing when 
investors fail to 
accurately estimate the 
riskiness of IPO stocks 








Table 1: Selection, Industry and IPO years of Final Sample  
PANEL A: Selection of sample IPO Firms 
Firms with an initial public offering (IPO) in the US during 1988-2007
a
  7,477 
    Less: repeat IPOs and  IPO firms which could not be found on CRSP   (14) 
    Less: IPO firms which could not be found on Compustat  (1,094) 
IPOs with both Compustat and CRSP identifiers 6,369 
    Less: IPOs without pre-IPO data on Compustat  (734) 
    Less: IPOs with missing values for key variables  (297) 
IPO firms with CRSP identifiers and key Compustat data 5,338 
PANEL B: Industry Composition of Sample of IPO Firms 
Industry Companies  % of sample 
Computer Software/Hardware 317  5.9 
Manufacturing/Equipment 915  17.3 
Services 1,655  31.0 
Trade-Wholesale/Retail 705  13.2 
Transportation 210  3.9 
Pharmaceuticals 399  7.5 
Financial Institutions 156  2.9 
Telecommunications 214  4.0 
Textile/Lumber and Paper Products 29  0.5 
Oil and Gas 131  2.5 
Insurance and Real Estate 215  4.0 
Mining and Construction 114  2.1 
Food/Tobacco 94  1.8 
Utilities 65  1.2 
Other 119  2.2 






Table 1: PANEL C: Annual Distribution of IPOs 
Year IPOs  % of sample 
1988 77  1.4 
1989 124  2.3 
1990 208  3.9 
1991 389  7.3 
1992 457  8.6 
1993 435  8.1 
1994 423  7.9 
1995 619  11.6 
1996 434  8.1 
1997 309  5.8 
1998 419  7.8 
1999 398  7.5 
2000 99  1.9 
2001 71  1.3 
2002 69  1.3 
2003 180  3.4 
2004 176  3.3 
2005 200  3.7 
2006 218  4.1 
2007 33  0.7 





 : From the Field-Ritter datasets of IPO founding dates available on Jay Ritter’s webpage 
(http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/FoundingDates.htm). Since firms were not required to provide cash flow 





Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of sample IPO firms (full sample) 











-0.13        
(-0.08) 
-0.08                        
(-0.06) 
-0.07              
(0.04) 
19.4 %                  
(0.0 %) 
111 %             
(19 %) 
0.08        
(0.06) 
14.3          
(8.0) 
TACC_TA  : Total accruals deflated by total assets = (EXBI – CFO)/ TA where              EXBI = 
income before extraordinary items; CFO = net operating cash flows;  TA = total 
assets; 
CFO_TA    : Operating cash flows deflated by total assets; 
Dividends   : Annual dividend as a percentage of income before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations; 
Sales           : Sales growth rate over the pre-IPO year; 
Capex_TA  : Capital expenditures, as a proportion of total assets;  
Age (years) : The difference between the IPO year and the year in which the business was 
formed (or the year of incorporation if the year of formation is not available). If 




Table 3: Initial Assessment and Correlation Matrix for the IPO variable, 
Accrual and Cash Flow Ranks: 
PANEL A: Correlation Matrix for the IPO variable, Accrual Rank and 
Cash Flow Rank: 
 Pearson Correlation Coefficient                                             
(p-value) 
 IPO ACC_Ranki CF_Ranki 
IPO 1.00000   
ACC_Ranki 0.26256      
(<0.0001) 
1.00000  
CF_Ranki -0.30752   
(<0.0001) 




PANEL B: Initial Assessment (IPO overpricing and the accrual anomaly) 
ARi
(post)   
=   a1 + b1IPOi + εi1                                                                                                                                           (1) 
ARi
(post)   
=   a2 + b2IPOi + c2[ACC_Ranki] + d2[CF_Ranki]  +  εi2                               (2)        
 Model (1)  Model (2) 
Dependent 
variable 
Annual abnormal returns Annual abnormal returns 
Type of regression Pooled                                         
(IPOs and matched non-IPOs)  
Pooled                                         
(IPOs and matched non-IPOs)  
Constant 0.18531  
(t= 8.87) 
0.19960 
 (t= 8.52) 
IPOi -0.13149 
(t= -4.88)  
-0.13232 








 (t= 5.38) 







Table 3 (cont’d): 
PANEL C: Testing c2 = d2 = 0: 
Numerator degrees of freedom     = 2 
Denominator degrees of freedom = 10,672 
F-statistic = [(1,607.83 – 1,540.06)/2]/[1,540.06/10,672]   = 234.81 (vs. critical value of 
3.00 at the 5% significance level)   
Thus c2 = d2 = 0 is rejected. 
 
* : In a regression model of abnormal returns on the accruals rank and the IPO indicator variable, 
b2 = -0.021 (t = -1.99). Thus, it seems that for my sample firms accruals explain post-IPO returns 
but once cash flows are included, accruals do not explain returns (Barone and Magilke 2009; 
Armstrong et al. 2009).                                               
ARi
(post)
                          = annual abnormal returns of firm i over the year following the IPO 
date; 
IPOi                                 =                   indicator variable which is equal to 1 if firm i is an IPO firm and 0 if 
it is a non-IPO firm;  




 ] for firm i in the pre-IPO year less 
the mean decile rank (4.5), divided by 9;                                          




 ] for firm i in the pre-IPO year less 
the mean decile rank (4.5), divided by 9;                                            
CFi
(pre)                                           
= operating cash flows of firm i measured for the last reporting period 
before the IPO date. This is the amount of operating cash flows in 
the statement of cash flows provided with the IPO prospectus; 
ACCi
(pre)
                         = accruals of firm i measured for the last reporting period before the 
IPO date. This is measured as the difference between earnings 
before extraordinary items and operating cash flows reported in the 
IPO prospectus;  
TAi
(pre)
                           = total assets of firm i measured at the last reporting date before the 
IPO date. This is the level of total assets in the financial statements 
provided with the IPO prospectus; 









Table 4: Discriminating between earnings-based explanations and other 
explanations of IPO mispricing (using all my sample IPOs) 
ARid
(post)
    = a3 + e3iAW  + εid3                                                                                               (3) 
ARi
(post)      
= a4 + c4[ACC_Ranki] + d4[CF_Ranki]+ εi4                                                          (4) 
ê3i             = a5 + δ5[ACC_Ranki]  + η5[CF_Ranki]
 
 + εi5                                   (5)  






Type of regression Firm-specific Pooled (all my 
sample IPOs) 
Pooled (all my 
sample IPOs) 






from model (3) 
Constant -0.00044 
  (t= -5.20)       
-0.13355 
 (t= -6.21) 
-0.00172 
 (t= -5.27 ) 
AW -0.00148 
  (t= -4.70)     
  
     
ACC_Ranki  -0.02682 
 (t= -1.98)   
0.00212 
 (t= 1.88) 
CF_Ranki  0.23959 
 (t= 3.52) 
0.00346 
 (t= 3.24) 
F-test of c4 = d4 = 0  21.48 
(p < 0.001) 
 
F-test of  δ5 = η5 = 0   86.88 
(p < 0.001) 
Number of firms 5,338 5,338 5,338 
Number of 
observations 










         = annual abnormal returns of firm i over the year following the IPO date; 
ARid
(post)
       = daily abnormal returns for firm i for day “d” in the year following the IPO 
date; 
AW                =                   indicator variable which is equal to 1 if the day over which the daily 
abnormal return of firm i [ARid
(post)
] is measured falls in the announcement 
window and 0 if the day “d” falls in the non-announcement window (the 
subscripts “i” and “d” on the indicator variable AW are omitted for 
brevity); 
ê3i                  = firm-specific coefficient of firm i on the announcement window indicator 
variable (AW) from the timing test model in equation (3). 




] for firm i 
in the pre-IPO year less the mean decile rank (4.5), divided by 9; 
CF_Ranki      = decile rank of cash flows deflated by total assets [CFi(pre) /TAi(pre)] for 
firm i in the pre-IPO year less the mean decile rank (4.5), divided by 9; 
CFi
(pre)                 
= operating cash flows of firm i measured for the last reporting period before 
the IPO date. This is the amount of operating cash flows in the statement 
of cash flows provided with the IPO prospectus; 
ACCi
(pre)
        = accruals of firm i measured for the last reporting period before the IPO 
date. This is measured as the difference between earnings before 




          = total assets of firm i measured at the last reporting date before the IPO 
date. This is the level of total assets in the financial statements provided 
with the IPO prospectus; 
εin                  = error term (firm i, equation n). 














Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of sample IPO firms (life cycle sample only) 




TACC_TA CFO_TA Dividends %ΔSales Capex_TA Age 
(years) 
Growth 
IPOs    
(1,917 
firms) 
-0.12        
(-0.08) 
-0.06                        
(-0.05) 
0.01             
(0.07) 




0.10        
(0.07) 






-0.10       
(-0.06) 
-0.09                        
(-0.09) 
0.12             
(0.10) 
42.6%        
(20%) 
28.8%           
(8%) 
0.08         
(0.05) 






-0.14        
(-0.08) 
-0.07                        
(-0.10) 
0.10             
(0.07) 
55.1%        
(30%) 
2.2%             
(-23%) 
0.01        
(0.01) 
26.6        
(11.0) 
TACC_TA      : Total accruals deflated by total assets = (EXBI – CFO)/ TA where         
EXBI = income before extraordinary items; CFO = net operating cash flows;  
TA = total assets; 
CFO_TA        : Operating cash flows deflated by total assets; 
Dividends       : Annual dividend as a percentage of income before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations; 
Sales               : Sales growth rate over the pre-IPO year; 
Capex_TA      : Capital expenditure, as a proportion of total assets;  
Age (years)     : The difference between the IPO year and the year in which the business was 
formed (or the year of incorporation if the year of formation is not 
available). If firms merge, the age of the merged firm is the larger of the 













Table 6: The role of life cycle stage (using the life cycle sample IPOs)  
ARi
(post)      
= a6 + f6GROWTHi + h6DECLINEi + εi6                                                                    (6) 
ê3i               
    
= a7 + f7GROWTHi + h7DECLINEi + εi7                                                                                       (7) 
ARi
(post) 
    = a8 + c8ACC_Ranki + d8CF_Ranki + f8GROWTHi + h8DECLINEi + εi8         (8)  
ê3i                 =a9+ δ9[ACC_Ranki] + η9[CF_Ranki]
 
 + f9GROWTHi + h9DECLINEi + εi9  (9) 
 Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) Model (9) 
Type of regression Pooled 
(sample IPOs 





























  (t= -6.22)       
-0.00114 
 (t= -1.07) 
-0.36197 
 (t= -6.62) 
-0.00127 
 (t= -1.20) 
GROWTHi 0.07848 
  (t= 1.29)     
-0.00016 
  (t= -0.14)     
0.04436 
  (t= 0.74)     
-0.00042 
  (t= -0.36)     
DECLINEi 0.02164 
  (t= 0.34)     
-0.00123 
  (t= -0.94)     
0.11945 
  (t= 1.85)     
-0.00100 
  (t= -0.76)     
ACC_Ranki   
    
-0.03524 
 (t= -0.59)   
-0.00274 
 (t= -2.21)   
CF_Ranki   
  
0.62318 
 (t= 10.02) 
0.00311 
 (t= 2.50) 
F-test of fn = hn = 0 
(n = 6, 7, 8, and 9) 
1.46  
(p > 0.10) 
2.74   
(p > 0.05) 
2.34 
(p > 0.10) 
1.87  
(p > 0.10) 
Number of firms 3,403 3,403 3,403 3,403 
Number of 
observations 
3,403 3,403 3,403 3,403 
 ARi
(post)
             = annual abnormal returns of firm i over the year following the IPO date; 





variable (AW) from the timing test model in equation (3). 
GROWTHi         =                   indicator variable which is equal to 1 if the IPO firm is in the growth stage 
and 0 otherwise; 
DECLINEi              = indicator variable which is equal to 1 if the IPO firm is in the decline stage 
and 0 otherwise 




] for firm i 
in the pre-IPO year less the mean decile rank (4.5), divided by 9; 




] for firm i 
in the pre-IPO year less the mean decile rank (4.5), divided by 9; 
 
CFi
(pre)                         
= operating cash flows of firm i measured for the last reporting period before 
the IPO date. This is the amount of operating cash flows in the statement of 
cash flows provided with the IPO prospectus; 
ACCi
(pre)
             = accruals of firm i measured for the last reporting period before the IPO date. 
This is measured as the difference between earnings before extraordinary 
items and operating cash flows reported in the IPO prospectus;  
TAi
(pre)
                = total assets of firm i measured at the last reporting date before the IPO date. 
This is the level of total assets in the financial statements provided with the 
IPO prospectus; 



















Table 7: Discriminating between earnings-based explanations and other 
explanations of IPO mispricing (using the life cycle sample IPOs) 
ARid
(post)
    = a10 + e10iAW  + εid10                                                                                          (10) 
ARi
(post)      
= a11 + c11[ACC_Ranki] + d11[CF_Ranki]+ εi11                                               (11) 
ê10i           = a12 + δ12[ACC_Ranki]  + η12[CF_Ranki]
 
 + εi12                            (12) 






Type of regression Firm-specific Pooled (all my 
sample IPOs) 
Pooled (all my 
sample IPOs) 






from model (10) 
PANEL A: Growth Firms Only (1,917 firms) 
Constant  -0.00045                    
(-3.58) 
-0.14177                  
(-4.45) 
-0.00188                
(-3.87) 
AW -0.00131                     
(-2.83) 
      
ACC_Ranki  -0.03530                  
(-0.36) 
0.00231           
(1.47) 
CF_Ranki  0.27393            
(2.69) 
0.00493           
(3.09) 
F-test of c11 = d11 = 0  13.6                        
(p < 0.001) 
 
F-test of  δ12 = η12 = 0   35.6                       

















Table 7 (cont’d) 
 






Type of regression Firm-specific Pooled (all my 
sample IPOs) 
Pooled (all my 
sample IPOs) 






from model (10) 
PANEL B: Mature Firms Only (1,098 firms) 
Constant -0.00035                   
(-1.51) 
-0.08376                
(-1.48) 
-0.00123                
(-1.67) 
AW -0.00114                     
(-1.57) 
  
ACC_Ranki  -0.06778                
(-0.36) 
0.00274           
(1.01) 
CF_Ranki  0.39713          
(2.22) 
-0.00265                
(-1.09) 
F-test of c11 = d11 = 0  11.6                       
(p < 0.001) 
 
F-test of  δ12 = η12 = 0   0.73                       
(p > 0.10) 
 
 
PANEL C: Decline Firms Only (488 firms) 
Constant -0.00043                   
(-2.26) 
-0.08751                
(-2.60) 
-0.00255                
(-3.63) 
AW -0.00238                   
(-3.62) 
  
ACC_Ranki  -0.01903               
(-0.81) 
0.00296           
(1.14) 
CF_Ranki  0.40482          
(2.09) 
-0.00036                
(-0.13) 
F-test of c11 = d11 = 0  5.6                         
(p < 0.001) 
 
F-test of  δ12 = η12 = 0   1.16                       











       = daily abnormal returns for firm i for day “d” in the year 
following the IPO date; 
ê3i                   = firm-specific coefficient of firm i on the announcement window 
indicator variable (AW) from the timing test model in equation 
(3). 
AW                 =                   indicator variable which is equal to 1 if the day over which the 
daily abnormal return of firm i [ARid
(post)
] is measured falls in the 
announcement window and 0 if the day “d” falls in the non-
announcement window (the subscripts “i” and “d” on the 
indicator variable AW are omitted for brevity); 





for firm i in the pre-IPO year less the mean decile rank (4.5), 
divided by 9; 





] for firm i in the pre-IPO year less the mean decile rank 
(4.5),divided by 9; 
 
CFi
(pre)                    
= operating cash flows of firm i measured for the last reporting 
period before the IPO date. This is the amount of operating cash 




        = accruals of firm i measured for the last reporting period before 
the IPO date. This is measured as the difference between 
earnings before extraordinary items and operating cash flows 
reported in the IPO prospectus;  
TAi
(pre)
           = total assets of firm i measured at the last reporting date before 
the IPO date. This is the level of total assets in the financial 
statements provided with the IPO prospectus; 
εid10                         = error term (firm i, day “d”, equation 10); 














Additional tests  
Table 8: Discriminating between earnings-based explanations and other 




    = a3 + e3iAW  + εid3                                                                                           (3) 
ARi
(post)      
= a4 + c4[ACC_Ranki] + d4[CF_Ranki]+ εi4                                                   (4) 
ê3i             = a5 + δ5[ACC_Ranki]  + η5[CF_Ranki]
 
 + εi5                              (5)  






Type of regression Firm-specific Pooled (all my 
sample IPOs) 










from model (3) 
Constant -0.00039 
  (t= -6.99)       
-0.45544 
  (t= -2.36)       
-0.00133 
  (t= -7.00)       
AW -0.00141 
  (t= -6.45)       
  
     
ACC_Ranki  -0.18804 
  (t= -0.15)       
0.00026 
  (t= 0.39)       
CF_Ranki  0.77757 
  (t= 2.76)       
0.00235 
  (t= 3.80)       
F-test of c4 = d4 =0  11.1                         
(p < 0.001) 
 
F-test of δ5 = η5 =0   18.6                       
(p < 0.001) 
Number of firms 5,338 5,338 5,338 
Number of 
observations 
3,609,000 5,338 5,338 
ARi
(post)




        = daily abnormal returns for firm i for day “d” in the year following 
the IPO date; 
AW                =                   indicator variable which is equal to 1 if the day over which the 
daily abnormal return of firm i [ARid
(post)
] is measured falls in the 
announcement window and 0 if the day “d” falls in the non-
announcement window (the subscripts “i” and “d” on the indicator 
variable AW are omitted for brevity); 
ê3i                  = firm-specific coefficient of firm i on the announcement window 
indicator variable (AW) from the timing test model in equation 
(3). 





for firm i in the pre-IPO year less the mean decile rank (4.5), 
divided by 9; 
CF_Ranki      = decile rank of cash flows deflated by total assets [CFi(pre) 
/TAi(pre)] for firm i in the pre-IPO year less the mean decile rank 
(4.5), divided by 9; 
CFi
(pre)                 
= operating cash flows of firm i measured for the last reporting 
period before the IPO date. This is the amount of operating cash 








        = accruals of firm i measured for the last reporting period before the 
IPO date. This is measured as the difference between earnings 
before extraordinary items and operating cash flows reported in 
the IPO prospectus;  
TAi
(pre)
          = total assets of firm i measured at the last reporting date before the 
IPO date. This is the level of total assets in the financial statements 
provided with the IPO prospectus; 
εin                  = error term (firm i, equation n). 






































Table 9: Discriminating between earnings-based explanations and other 
explanations of IPO mispricing (using the life cycle sample IPOs and 750       
post-IPO days)  
ARid
(post)
    = a10 + e10iAW  + εid10                                                                               (10) 
ARi
(post)      
= a11 + c11[ACC_Ranki] + d11[CF_Ranki]+ εi11                                      (11) 
ê10i             = a11 + δ12[ACC_Ranki]  + η12[CF_Ranki]
 
 + εi12                    (12)  






Type of regression Firm-specific Pooled (all my 
sample IPOs) 
Pooled (all my 
sample IPOs) 






from model (10) 


















F-test of c11 = d11 = 0  19.8                       
(p < 0.001) 
 
F-test of  δ12 = η12 = 0   12.9  
(p < 0.001) 
 





















F-test of c11 = d11 = 0  16.7  
(p < 0.001) 
 
F-test of  δ12 = η12 = 0   0.41  














Table 9 cont’d 




















F-test of c11 = d11 = 0  10.4 
(p < 0.001) 
 
F-test of  δ12 = η12 = 0   2.1  
(p > 0.10) 
ARi
(post)




       = daily abnormal returns for firm i for day “d” in the year 
following the IPO date; 
AW                =                   indicator variable which is equal to 1 if the day over which the 
daily abnormal return of firm i [ARid
(post)
] is measured falls in 
the announcement window and 0 if the day “d” falls in the non-
announcement window (the subscripts “i” and “d” on the 
indicator variable AW are omitted for brevity); 
ê3i                  = firm-specific coefficient of firm i on the announcement window 
indicator variable (AW) from the timing test model in equation 
(3). 





] for firm i in the pre-IPO year less the mean decile rank 
(4.5), divided by 9; 
CF_Ranki      = decile rank of cash flows deflated by total assets [CFi(pre) 
/TAi(pre)] for firm i in the pre-IPO year less the mean decile 
rank (4.5), divided by 9; 
CFi
(pre)                 
= operating cash flows of firm i measured for the last reporting 
period before the IPO date. This is the amount of operating cash 




        = accruals of firm i measured for the last reporting period before 
the IPO date. This is measured as the difference between 
earnings before extraordinary items and operating cash flows 
reported in the IPO prospectus;  
TAi
(pre)
           = total assets of firm i measured at the last reporting date before 
the IPO date. This is the level of total assets in the financial 
statements provided with the IPO prospectus; 
εin                  = error term (firm i, equation n); 
εid10                        = error term (firm i, day “d”, equation 10); 
 
 
